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SHIELDED BEYOND STATE LIMITS:
EXAMINING CONFLICT-OF-LAW
ISSUES IN LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIPS
After Enron Corp.'s demise, accounting firm Arthur Andersen
braced itself for potentially crushing liability stemming from its
role in the energy corporation's collapse.' Since Enron's bank-
ruptcy, Arthur Andersen has been convicted of criminal charges
2
and currently faces civil claims in an estimated amount of one bil-
lion dollars.3 The civil cases pending against Arthur Andersen
worry many partners within the accounting firm, as they wonder
how much liability, if any, they will have to shoulder personally.4
One bright spot for Arthur Andersen's partners is that the firm was
formed as a limited liability partnership. The LLP business form
limits the personal liability of partners. 5 However, the LLP struc-
ture remains untested in a number of ways. One of the biggest
questions facing Arthur Andersen is whether the LLP's liability
protections will be recognized or whether the court will 1Pierce the
liability shield to assign personal liability to the partners.
I Anthony Lin, After Enron, Firms Rethink Partnership, 227 N.Y. L.J. 1, 1 (2002). See
generally Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 9 (2002), for factual background of the Enron scandal.
2 See Kurt Eichenwald, Arthur Andersen Guilty, Accounting Firm Announces It Is Going
out of Business, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 16, 2002, at Al; see also Ken Brown et al.,
Andersen Fires Partner It Says Led Shredding of Documents, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2002, at AI
(describing some of the actions that led to criminal charges against Arthur Andersen for destruc-
tion of documents).
3 Susan Saab Fortney, High Drama and Hindsight: The LLP Shield, Post-Andersen, Bus.
L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 46, 47.
4 Mitchell Pacelle & lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Partners Forever? Within Andersen, Personal
Liability May Bring Ruin, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2002, at C1.
5 In contrast to LLPs, partners in a general partnership are personally liable for all debts
and obligations of the partnership. See generally UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 15 (1914) (providing that
a partner is jointly liable for all obligations of the partnership and severally liable for wrongful
acts); cf REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP AcT §§ 306, 307 (1997) (providing that partners are jointly and
severally liable for all of the partnership's obligations, but the assets of the partnership must be
inadequate or exhausted before relief can be sought from the partners).
6 Fortney, supra note 3, at 47.
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This is just one of many questions raised by the Arthur An-
dersen case. A choice-of-law question exists as well. Arthur An-
dersen was organized under Illinois law, which limits personal li-
ability of partners only for tort claims. 7 The civil cases are pend-
ing in federal district court in Texas, which grants broad protection
to partners in LLPs for all obligations whether arising from tort or
contract claims. 8 This poses the question as to which state's liabil-
ity shield will be recognized. This Note focuses on this choice-of-
law question as it relates to LLPs in general, and will seek to an-
swer which jurisdiction's law should apply to regulate the liability
of partners within an LLP.
Limited liability partnerships are recent creations in the realm
of business associations. The first limited liability partnerships
appeared around a decade ago, in the early 1990s. The newness of
this business association is important; because LLPs have not been
in existence for long, there has not been time or opportunity to de-
velop much case law dealing with this business form.9 This means
that there are many questions and uncertainties regarding the LLP
form. Uncertainties also exist because of the inconsistent manner
in which LLP statutes were adopted. Within ten years, all fifty
states had adopted some form of an LLP provision.'l But the laws
were not uniform in the extent of liability protection afforded to
partners. I' The early LLP statutes created narrow protections for
partners in LLPs. These so-called "narrow-shield" statutes pro-
tected partners against vicarious liability only for malpractice or
tort claims. As the LLP form spread in popularity, the liability
shield expanded. Later statutes, known as "broad-shield" statutes,
protected partners from contract liability in addition to tort liabil-
ity. The trend has been for states to adopt a broad-shield type pro-
vision. However, almost one-third of the states still retain a nar-
row-shield provision.' 2
7 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/15 (West 1993). This provision has been amended to
now provide liability protection from all debts and obligations, whether arising from tort or
contract. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 206/306 (West Supp. 2003) (effective Jan. 1, 2003).
However, the amendment provision is not retroactive and does not cover partnerships organized
before January 1, 2003. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/90 (West 1993 & Supp. 2003).
8 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
9 Alan R. Bromberg and Larry E. Ribstein cite the "novelty problem" surrounding LLPs.
Because LLPs are novel business associations in comparison to corporations and partnerships,
there is an absence of accepted customs and a paucity of case law to address uncertainties and
questions that may arise. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1.07(a)(17) (2001).
10 See Elaine A. Welle, When Are Limited Liability Partnership Interests Securities?, 27 J.
CORP. L. 63, 63 (2001) (noting that by 2001 every state permitted the formation of LLPs).
I See Carol J. Miller, LLPs: How Limited Is Limited Liability?, 53 J. Mo. B. 154, 154
(1997) (listing five levels of varying degrees of liability protection).
12 Currently, thirteen states still have narrow-shield liability provisions. These include
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This difference in liability provisions may or may not be sig-
nificant. The courts have not yet answered such questions as what
would happen when an LLP formed in a broad-shield state is sued
in a narrow-shield jurisdiction. Would the LLP's broad-shield
protection be recognized, or would the partners' vicarious liability
be judged under the more narrow statute? Similarly, would part-
ners of an LLP formed in a narrow-shield jurisdiction be granted
the protections of a broad-shield state if sued in that state? 3 LLP
statutes generally contain choice-of-law provisions, which answer
these questions by applying the law of the state of organization.'
4
But these provisions have not yet been tested in court. Will these
provisions be recognized? If not, what state's law should apply?
Where should the court look for guidance if it should decide to
look beyond a choice-of-law provision?
In attempting to answer these questions, this Note examines
state LLP statutes and their liability and choice-of-law provisions.
The choice-of-law question is also examined under a traditional
conflict-of-law analysis. The end result shows that courts should
recognize statutory choice-of-law provisions. The analysis also
shows that if a court looks beyond a state's choice-of-law provi-
sion, the outcome would still be the same under conflict-of-law
theories. 15  Therefore, this Note demonstrates that the liability
shield provided for by the state of formation governs the liability
of partners in any jurisdiction.
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.220
(Banks-Baldwin 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3431 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
31, § 295 (West Supp. 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 449.46 (West 2002); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. 87.150 (Michie 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-A:15 (Supp. 2002); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 59-45 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1775.14 (Anderson 2002); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8204 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-370 (Law Co-op. 1990 &
Supp. 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-1-306 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-12 (2002); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 47B-3-6 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003).
'3 While the choice-of-law question applies to LLPs formed in broad-shield states and nar-
row-shield states alike, the potential consequences for each are different. Partners in an LLP
formed in a broad-shield state face potentially damaging risks if the broad-shield is not recog-
nized in every jurisdiction. In contrast, partners in narrow-shield LLPs would receive the bene-
fit of additional liability protection if the narrow-shield was not recognized in broad-shield
states.
14 See Stephen M. Brusini & Stephen D. Zubiago, Crossing the Border: The Use of Lim-
ited Liability Partnerships in Interstate Commerce, R.I. B.J., Apr. 1999, at 9, 42 (commenting
that choice-of-law provisions in LLP statutes is an area of uniformity among the states).
15 Cf infra Part I.D. (discussing choice-of-law provisions in LLP statutes and noting that
most provisions provide that the law of the state of formation should apply in all cases).
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I. LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP STATUTES
A. The Birth of Limited Liability Partnerships
In order to better understand the dichotomy between broad-
shield and narrow-shield LLP provisions, the limited liability part-
nership form itself must be put into context. The history of how
the limited liability partnership first developed is helpful in com-
prehending the split between jurisdictions and why it exists.
The limited liability partnership first appeared in Texas in
1991.16 The arrival of the limited liability partnership was a direct
result of the savings and loan crisis.17 The widespread failure of
the savings and loan institutions in the late 1980s and early 1990s
led to numerous lawsuits against shareholders, directors, and offi-
cers of the failed financial institutions. The amounts recovered
from these suits were insufficient to cover the actual financial
losses suffered.' 8 As a result, claims were filed against the lawyers
and accountants who were closely involved with these institutions.
Claims against law and accounting firms were attractive be-
cause the firms generally had substantial malpractice insurance
and many wealthy partners from whom money could be recov-
ered. 19 These lawsuits affected a large proportion of the law firms
and accounting firms in Texas. 20 Many of these law firms and ac-
counting firms were organized as general partnerships. As a re-
sult, the lawsuits put all of the partners at peril, even those who did
not do any savings and loan work.21 "The[se] suits highlighted the
vicarious liability of partners for each other's conduct, a liability
that did not exist in other forms of professional organization.,
22
The result of this experience was an amendment to Texas'
Uniform Partnership Act that limited partners' joint and several
16 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.01(a).
17 See generally M. Mazen Anbari, Banking on a Bailout: Directors' and Officers' Liabil-
ity Insurance Policy Exclusions in the Context of the Savings and Loan Crisis, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 547 (1992), for background on the savings and loan crisis, and B. Seth Bailey, Chopping
at the Roots: A Proposal to Change the Focus of Criminal Laws Dealing with Savings and Loan
Fraud, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 401, 405 (1997), for a discussion of the foundations leading to the
savings and loan failures.
18 Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth
(Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1069-71 (1995) (discussing the birth of limited liability
partnerships in Texas after the savings and loan crisis).
11 Id. at 1069; Patrick Cammarata, Allowing Attorneys to Swing for the Fences: The Mas-
sachusetts Limited Liability Partnership Act, 38 B.C. L. REV. 949, 954 (1997) (noting that the
suits against the law firms involved in the savings and loan crisis allowed plaintiffs to recoup
under multi-million dollar insurance policies and firm assets).
20 Hamilton, supra note 18.
21 Brusini & Zubiago, supra note 14, at 9; see supra note 5.
22 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.01(a), at 3.
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liability.23 The amendment passed and was supported by profes-
sional firms that wanted limited liability but disliked incorporation
for tax, professional tradition, or other reasons. 24  The new LLP
law was popular; within two years of its passage, almost 600 Texas
law firms had organized as limited liability partnerships.
B. Development of the Broad-Shield, Narrow-Shield Divide
The original Texas LLP statute was very narrow in its applica-
tion and protections. First, the LLP form was only available for a
short list of professional partnerships, such as doctors, account-
ants, and attorneys. 26  Second, it limited liability only for tort-
based claims arising from errors, omissions, negligence, or malfea-
sance of other partners.27 It did not extend to protect partners from
vicarious liability for wrongful acts of partners that they super-
28vised, nor for debts or obligations arising from other causes.
Other states soon followed in Texas' footsteps but passed
broader limited liability statutes. A second generation of LLP
statutes protected partners from liability for "debts and obliga-
tions" but continued to link the liability protection to claims aris-
ing from tort negligence and wrongful acts. 29 Finally, a third gen-
eration of statutes appeared, protecting partners from personal li-
ability for all debts and obligations of the partnership whether they
arose from a tort or from a contract.3 °
The second-generation statutes represent narrow-shield LLP
provisions, which are still in effect in one-third of the states.3'
23 Cammarata, supra note 19, at 954 (noting that this amendment was initiated by three
Texas attorneys).
24 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.01(a); see also Carol R. Goforth, Limited Li-
ability Partnerships: The Newest Game in Town, 1997 ARK. L. NOTEs 25 (noting that some of
the same reasons for selecting the LLP form exist today).
25 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.01(a), at 6 n.7.
26 Id. § 1.01(a).
27 Carol R. Goforth, Limiting the Liability of General Partners in LLPs: An Analysis of
Statutory Alternatives, 75 OR. L. REV. 1139, 1147; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b,
§ 3.08 (LEXIS through 1994 Supp.), amended by TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08
(Vernon Supp. 2003).
28 Miller, supra note 11, at 154-55 (discussing Texas' first limited liability partnership
statute).
29 Id. at 155 (describing the "second generation" as statutes passed after 1993). An exam-
ple of a second generation statute is Louisiana's LLP provision, which allowed partners protec-
tion from malpractice and tort claims, including willful and intentional misconduct. See LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3431 (LEXIS through 1994 Supp.), amended by LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:3431 (West 1997).
30 Miller, supra note 11, at 155. New York and Minnesota were the first states to enact
LLP provisions protecting partners from tort liability and contract liability. However, see
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.01(c), for an interesting discussion about differences
between the New York and Minnesota statutes showing how Minnesota's provision was even
broader than New York's.
31 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (listing states with such provisions).
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These statutes protect partners only from tort liability, leaving
partners unprotected from liability for contract claims. 32  An ex-
ample of a narrow-shield provision is Ohio's LLP statute, which
provides that a partner in an LLP is "not liable, directly or indi-
rectly ... for debts, obligations, or other liabilities of any kind...
arising from negligence or from wrongful acts, errors, omissions,
or misconduct, whether or not intentional or characterized as tort,
contract, or otherwise. 33 Despite any apparent ambiguity in the
language that may lead one to believe that this statute protects
partners from contract liability, the statute does not reach that far.
The statute's language is only meant to cover the type of miscon-
duct or negligence that could also breach a contract, so that tort
claims are protected no matter how they may be characterized in
court.34
In contrast, broad-shield provisions protect partners from con-
tract liability as well as tort liability. Missouri's broad-shield pro-
vision states that a partner is not "directly or indirectly [liable] for
any debts, obligations and liabilities of, or chargeable to, the part-
nership or each other, whether in tort, contract or otherwise. 35 In
spite of this broad protection from vicarious liability, partners are
still liable for debts and obligations arising from their own negli-
gence, as they are in narrow-shield states.
36
The differences among liability shields do not end with the
broad-shield and narrow-shield classification. Even within these
two categories, there are varying degrees of liability protection.37
However, it is this split between broad-shield and narrow-shield
jurisdictions that gives rise to the choice-of-law question at hand.
The question is whether an LLP's liability shield as provided by its
32 See Brusini & Zubiago, supra note 14, at 10 (discussing Rhode Island's LLP provision
and the fact that it protects partners from only one type of liability). The result of such a statute
is that partners may remain jointly liable for partnership obligations arising from contracts. Id.
This is similar to the liability partners in a general partnership face. See sources cited supra
note 5.
33 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1775.14(B) (Anderson 2002); see also Brusini & Zubiago,
supra note 14, at 10 (analyzing Rhode Island's statute, which is similar to Ohio's, and
characterizing it as a narrow-shield provision).
.4 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.01(b), at I I n.18 (commenting on the 1994
version of Delaware's LLP provision, which contained language similar to Ohio's current stat-
ute).
35 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 358-150 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); see Brusini & Zubiago, supra
note 14, at 9, 10 (discussing the characteristics and language of broad-shield statutes).
36 Miller, supra note l1, at 155-56. Some states also provide that partners are still liable
for wrongdoing by other partners under their direct supervision and control. Only a few states
have eliminated partner liability for supervisory-based vicarious liability. Id. at 156; see also
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 358-150 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003) (maintaining partner liability for a part-
ner's own acts or for misconduct of any person under the partner's direct supervision and con-
trol).
37 Miller, supra note I I, at 154.
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state of organization would be recognized in a jurisdiction with a
contrasting liability shield. Most LLP statutes contain a choice-of-
law provision. 38  But LLP statutes, including their choice-of-law
provisions, have not been challenged in court. The outcome of the
choice-of-law question remains to be seen.
C. Limited Liability Theories in LLPs
The trend among states is to provide for a broad-shield.39 But
the split among broad-shield and narrow-shield jurisdictions may
remain for some time. Not all states may adopt a broad-shield as
the choice regarding how much liability protection to provide part-
ners in an LLP is guided by a number of theoretical underpin-
nings.a0
One such theoretical consideration supports the danger tort li-
ability poses to a partnership's existence. The reason both narrow-
shield and broad-shield statutes provide limited liability protection
for tort obligations is that tort claims can create potentially disas-
trous liability.4' Partners in a general partnership may face over-
whelming liability for uncontrollable events.42 This liability may
leave the partnership and all the individual partners facing huge
punitive damages because of the tortious conduct of one partner.43
Furthermore, it may be hard for partners to control the negligent or
tortious conduct of other partners. Often, there is little a partner
can do to prevent another partner from creating liabilities. As
such, imposing vicarious personal liability does not act to encour-
age partners to act in the best interests of creditors or clients.44
Moreover, imposing vicarious liability for torts can impose costs
31 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
39 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.01(c) (stating that two-thirds of the states
have enacted broad-shield provisions).
40 The discussion in this Note is limited to theories underlying limited liability in LLPs.
For a brief overview of theories underlying the general concept of limited liability, see Rebecca
J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the Common Law
Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 103-09 (2001).
41 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 3.02.
42 See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 15 (1914) (providing that a partner is jointly liable for all obli-
gations of the partnership and severally liable for wrongful acts); cf REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT
§ § 306, 307 (1997) (providing that partners are jointly and severally liable for all of the partner-
ship's obligations, but the assets of the partnership must be inadequate or exhausted before relief
can be sought from the partners).
43 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text (discussing the liability general partners
faced in the aftermath of the savings and loan scandal); see also Fortney, supra note 3, at 47
("The situation the Andersen partners ... face is the very type of catastrophe that the LLP struc-
ture was intended to address - the risk of personal liability when the firm's assets and insurance
are wholly inadequate to satisfy claims.").
44 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 3.02 (stating that partners can often control
contract liability, but that there is little partners could do to prevent tort liabilities).
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on partnerships that exceed any social benefit derived from vicari-
ous liability. 45  For these reasons, extending limited liability pro-
tection for tort claims to partners in an LLP makes sense.
Some additional theoretical considerations argue against ex-
tending liability protection for contract claims. The first such
theoretical consideration centers on the effect that limiting con-
tractual liability would have on a partner's behavior within an
LLP. An LLP presents special risks to creditors due to its struc-
ture.4 6 Partners are, by definition, co-owners of the partnership.47
They have the right, as co-owners, to participate directly in manag-
ing the business. Partners directly participating in management
can cause the business to engage in activities that injure creditors.
While it is good for businesses to take risks, limited liability may
encourage partners in an LLP to take risks that have high potential
payoffs for themselves but impose costly risks on the LLP's credi-
tors.48 Other risks presented by limiting liability in LLPs are also
unique to this business form. The fact that co-owners directly
manage the business differentiates LLPs from other business asso-
ciations like limited partnerships and corporations, where the own-
ers may not be the ones managing the business.4 9 Additionally,
unlike all other business forms, LLP statutes do not restrict distri-
butions or compromises of contribution obligations, which can in-
crease the risk to creditors who rely on firm assets when making
business decisions. 50 The way to mitigate these risks in an LLP is
to provide a restricted form of limited liability, 51 i.e., enact a nar-
row-shield LLP statute.
A second consideration focuses on further potential effects of
limiting liability for contractual breaches. By not limiting liability
45 Id. § 3.01 (c) (providing a detailed analysis of the social benefits derived from vicarious
liability, or lack thereof, and the tenuous effect vicarious liability has on businesses and partner-
ships); see also supra text accompanying notes 19-22 (noting the huge vicarious liabilities of
partners in connection with the savings and loan crisis).
46 See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.03(b) (comparing LLPs to corporations
and other unincorporated business forms).
47 UNIF. P'SHiP ACT § 6 (1914); REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 101 (1997).
48 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.03(a).
49 Id. § 1.03(b). In this respect, LLPs do not differ from limited liability companies and
close corporations, where business owners directly manage the business and have limited liabil-
ity. However, as noted above, other characteristics of the LLP differentiate it from even these
business forms. Id.
0 Id.
51 Id. However, there are ways in which such risks may be mitigated without requiring a
narrow-shield. First, states can (and some do) require LLPs to have a certain amount of insur-
ance. Second, not limiting liability for a partner's own wrongdoings or supervisory liability
may be a sufficient enough restriction on limiting liability. Id. Liability for a partner's own acts
or supervisory liability may not be limited even in broad-shield jurisdictions. See supra note 36
and accompanying text.
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for contract obligations, the "basic vicarious liability nature of
partnership" is preserved.52 Under the uniform partnership acts,
partners retain joint liability for contract obligations and joint and
several liability for tort obligations. 53 Partnerships remain the only
business formations that permit vicarious liability against part-
ners. 54 Therefore, it may be necessary for LLPs to retain some vi-
carious liability in order to remain true to the partnership form and
to maintain partnership status under regulatory statutes.55 Not lim-
iting contractual liability also places the onus on partners to act in
the interests of creditors and clients. This is based on a theory that
any injury resulting from a breach may be foreseeable and, there-
fore, the partners could act to prevent the injury and avoid liability.
Partners can contract and negotiate for liability protection from
contractual breaches.56 It is common for partners in partnerships
to enter into enforceable "nonrecourse" contracts with creditors.
These nonrecourse contracts state that creditors will not seek com-
pensation from the partners' individual assets.57 One could argue
that partners need no further protection.
For these reasons, some states may continue to favor a nar-
row-shield. It is important to note, however, that there are many
arguments against narrow-shields and in favor of broad-shield pro-
tection.58 Because of the various theoretical considerations, there
may never be uniformity among limited liability partnership provi-
sions when it comes to the level of protection afforded to partners,
as some states will continue to favor a narrow-shield and others the
broad-shield.
52 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 3.03(b).
-3 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 15 (1914); REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 306 (1997).
5 General partnership and limited partnership statutes hold some or all partners vicari-
ously liable for partnership obligations. See UNIF. P'SHIP AT § 15 (1914); REVISED UNIF.
P'SHIP AT § 306 (1997); UNIF. LTD. P'SHip ACT § 303 (1985). LLCs and corporations protect
owners from vicarious liability. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 303 (1996); MODEL Bus.
CORP. AT § 6.22 (1984).
15 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 3.03(b).
56 Id. § 1.03(b).
57 Id. § 3.01(b). Interestingly, some argue that partners in an LLP should automatically
have limited liability against contract claimants because the LLP status of a business provides
notice to creditors and clients. This notice sufficiently warns creditors of the limited liability
nature of the partnership and should encourage creditors to seek ways to protect themselves in
their dealings with such businesses. See id.
58 See id. § 3.03(b) (providing several arguments against unlimited contractual liability
and lending support to a broad-shield formation). Furthermore, support for broad-shield protec-
tion is demonstrated from the fact that two-thirds of the states now provide this type of protec-
tion for LLPs. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (listing statutes with narrow-shield
provisions). For further discussion on theories underlying broad-shield and narrow-shield for-
mulations, see Goforth, supra note 27, at 11.70-96, favoring ultimately a narrow-shield ap-
proach.
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The limited liability afforded to partners in a limited liability
partnership is the most significant feature of the business form.59
It is also the feature that may create the most uncertainty for part-
ners. The strength of the limited liability protection offered by the
LLP has yet to be tested. The question remains whether an entity
formed in a broad-shield jurisdiction will have its protections rec-
ognized when sued in a narrow-shield jurisdiction or vice versa.
The analysis below will show that based on statutory language and
conflict-of-law theories, the shield provided by the state of organi-
zation will likely be recognized by courts in other jurisdictions.
D. LLPs and Choice-of-Law Provisions
As noted above, two-thirds of the states have enacted an LLP
statute granting a broad-shield type protection to partners, while
one-third of the states maintain a narrow-shield provision.6° This
split among states' liability provisions may lead to some uncer-
tainty when limited liability partnerships with one type of shield
are sued in a jurisdiction that provides for a different liability
shield. This uncertainty has generally been ameliorated by the fact
that LLP statutes today contain a choice-of-law provision. 61 In-
deed, one could say that choice of law is one area of uniformity in
LLP provisions. 62  These choice-of-law provisions are similar to
Ohio's statute, which states that "the organization and internal af-
fairs of a foreign [LLP] and the liability of the partners for the
debts, obligations, or other liabilities... shall be governed by the
laws of the state under which the foreign [LLP] is organized., 63
59 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 1.02(b) (explaining that the level of liability
protection afforded affects not only the partners' liability, but internal rules governing LLPs, the
treatment of LLPs under regulatory provisions like the bankruptcy and tax codes, and a busi-
ness's choice to form a limited liability partnership).
60 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (listing statutes with narrow-shield provi-
sions).
61 See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, tbl. 6-2 (showing that all states but Louisi-
ana have adopted an LLP statute containing a choice-of-law provision). In 1993, the District of
Columbia was the first jurisdiction to include a choice-of-law provision in its LLP statute. The
D.C. law provided that foreign limited liability partnerships could qualify and register locally
and be governed by the liability limitations of the state in which they were formed. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-147 (1994 Supp.) (repealed 1998).
62 Brusini & Zubiago, supra note 14, at 42.
63 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1775.05(C) (Anderson 2002). Note that a foreign limited li-
ability partnership means any partnership organized and registered as an LLP under the laws of
another state. Id. § 1775.05(D). However, not all states provide that the law of the state of
formation will govern the liability of partners. Pennsylvania's statute provides that the liability
of partners shall be governed by the laws of the jurisdiction under which the LLP was organ-
ized, except that the partners shall not be entitled greater protection from liability than is avail-
able to partners in a domestic LLP. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8211 (West 1995 & Supp.
2003). Pennsylvania is a narrow-shield state and therefore, its provision seems to reject
recognition of the broad-shield protections that a majority of other jurisdictions provide to
partners.
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These provisions seem to answer clearly the choice-of-law
question, as they provide that the law of the state where the LLP
was organized will govern the LLP in other jurisdictions. This
would mean that the liability protection provided to partners of an
LLP formed in a broad-shield state would extend to protect them
when sued in a narrow-shield state. But this may not be the case.
The way in which some state LLP statutes define what qualifies as
a foreign LLP creates some uncertainty as to how the LLPs will be
governed and whether the state of formation's law will actually
apply. For example, some state statutes define foreign limited li-
ability partnerships as those firms that are not only denominated as
such under the law of the state of organization, but that also meet
some sort of "similarity" test, though this test may not be de-
fined.64 One such state provision is Colorado's LLP statute. The
statute defines a foreign LLP as an entity that is formed under the
laws of a jurisdiction other than the State of Colorado and is func-
tionally equivalent to a domestic LLP.65 Yet, the statute fails to
define the term "functionally equivalent." Since Colorado is a
broad-shield state,66 does that mean that an LLP formed in a nar-
row-shield state would not be functionally equivalent? Alabama's
state statute provides that a foreign limited liability partnership is a
partnership formed under the laws of another state as either a part-
nership or limited liability partnership in which no partner is per-
sonally liable for debts or obligations under the law of such state.67
Under this statute, an LLP formed in a narrow-shield jurisdiction
would not fall within this definition because partners are still per-
sonally liable for contract liability. In such instances, would the
law of the state of formation be applied or ignored? 68 Courts have
not yet provided the answer to such questions and LLP provisions
remain largely unchallenged. In order to answer the choice-of-law
questions presented by LLP statutes, it may be necessary to look to
conflict-of-law theories. 69
64 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 6.02(a).
65 COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-90-102 (2002).
66 COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-60-115(2)(a) (2002).
67 ALA. CODE § 10-8A-101(4) (1999 & Supp. 2002).
68 There may be other statutory provisions involved in the choice-of-law provision. For
example, if a state's LLP provision states that a foreign limited liability partnership is governed
by the law of the state of formation, that may not be the end of the analysis. The law of the state
of formation may provide that the LLP is governed by the state where its chief executive office
is located. The LLP provision may also allow partners to elect which jurisdiction will govern its
partnership agreement. However, some states do not allow partners to waive the state of forma-
tion's law regarding partner liability by a contractual choice-of-law provision. See BROMBERG
& RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 6.03; REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 106 (1997).
69 However, there may be other ways around the choice-of-law conflict. See BROMBERG
& RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 6.02, which discusses the effects of LLP statute registration re-
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I. LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND
CONFLICT-OF-LAW THEORIES
As discussed above, limited liability statutes contain a choice-
of-law provision stating that a state must recognize and apply the
law of the state under which the LLP was formed. However, as
also noted, there are ambiguities in LLP laws that may create a
loophole in choice-of-law provisions. When courts are confronted
with such choice-of-law conflicts, they turn to general conflict-of-
law theories.7 °
The study of conflict of laws focuses on events that have legal
implications involving more than one sovereign. 71 Conflict of
laws involves the basic question of whether courts should empha-
size the law of the state where parties reside, or the law of the state
in which significant events occurred.72 This question is complex
due to the disagreement between courts and scholars as to the pre-
ferred approach to resolving conflict-of-law problems.73 The area
of conflict of laws is described as "a dismal swamp, filled with
quacking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric pro-
fessors who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and in-
comprehensible jargon., 74 Despite this, conflict of laws continues
to be a pervasive and developing area of law.
A. Major Approaches to the Choice-of-Law Question
Over time, various approaches to conflict-of-law questions
have been developed. Four major conflict-of-law approaches in-
clude the First Restatement's vested-rights approach, the Second
Restatement approach, Brainerd Currie's interest-analysis ap-
proach, and the better-law approach.75 At present, a majority of
quirements that may also alleviate the problem of how to treat a foreign LLP.
70 The Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws provides that states must recognize
and follow statutory choice-of-law provisions. Should a jurisdiction determine that the choice-
of-law provision would not apply to a foreign LLP, conflict-of-law principles would apply.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(l) (197 1).
71 WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF
LAWS § I (1984).
72 ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 2 (4th ed. 1986).
73 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 7 1, § 44 (discussing the history of and various
approaches to conflict of laws).
74 EDWIN SCOTT FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW FOR AMERICAN COURTS: A MULTILAT-
ERALIST METHOD I (2001) (referring to a statement made by William L. Prosser in Interstate
Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959 (1953)). The field of conflict of laws has further been at-
tacked by Professor Perry Dane, who referred to conflict of laws as "the law's psychiatric
ward." Id.; see also ROBERT A. SEDLER, ACROSS STATE LINES: APPLYING THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS TO YOUR PRACTICE I (1989).
71 These will be discussed in detail below. This Note has limited its analysis to these four
common approaches, but other conflict-of-law theories exist, such as Lea Brilmayer's negative
rights approach, Edwin Scott Fruehwald's multilateralist method, and Albert Ehrenzweig's true
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76courts follow the Second Restatement. Yet, the question as to
which approach to use is by no means settled.
1. Underlying Factors in Picking a Choice-of-Law Approach
With various approaches to choose from, how do courts
choose? One way may be to look at the social and legal goals un-
derlying each approach. There are various ways of classifying
these approaches, and how an approach is classified may lend in-
sight into its underlying social and legal goals. For example, one
method of classification divides the approaches between "jurisdic-
tion selecting systems" and "content selecting systems. 77 A juris-
diction-selecting system is one that chooses a state's law regard-
less of the substance of the case or the legal policy. A jurisdiction-
selecting system is an approach that would apply a bright-line rule.
An example would be a choice-of-law rule providing that the law
of the state where a car accident occurred always applies in car
accident cases.78 In contrast, a content-selecting system chooses
and applies a particular state law based on the motivating policy of
the laws. A content-selecting system would be one in which the
court would examine the public policy behind the competing state
laws. Then the impact of the choice-of-law decision on that policy
would be considered.79
Another method of classification is that of unilateralist or
multilateralist approaches. A unilateralist approach favors the fo-
rum state's law and asks whether lawmakers intended the law to
apply to the particular facts at hand and whether or not there is a
state interest in the issue. If it is determined that the law's scope
encompasses the controversy, a court will apply the forum law
even if another state has a greater interest. 80 One could imagine
that a unilateralist approach might involve a bright-line rule apply-
ing the forum state's laws in most occasions. On the other hand, a
multilateralist approach tries to connect the controversy with the
most appropriate legal system. Restrictions on multilateralist ap-
proaches are that (1) it may not reflect any unjustified preference,
rules approach. See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAW: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIREC-
TIONS 25-27 (1995); FRUEHWALD, supra note 74, at 103-22; RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra
note 71, § 67 (discussing Ehrenzweig's true rules approach).
76 SEDLER, supra note 74, at 28.
77 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 71, § 44 (describing these "systems" of identifying
conflict-of-law theories).
78 See id. This example is similar to the First Restatement. See infra Part I.A.2.
79 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 71, § 44. Another example of a content select-
ing system is the interest-analysis approach discussed below. See infra Part II.A.4.
80 FRUEHWALD, supra note 74, at 2 (noting further that often a unilateralist approach re-
sults in the application of forum law).
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and (2) the choice-of-law outcome must be foreseeable by the par-
ties involved in the dispute. In this respect, a multilateralist ap-
proach could be similar to a jurisdiction-selecting system in that it
would apply the laws of the territory where the last act in a chain
of events occurred.8' Such an approach would be both impartial
and foreseeable.
One final classification distinguishes between consequentialist
approaches and deontological approaches. 82 Consequentialist ap-
proaches focus on policy and social goals by considering which
state's law produces the better result for society at large. Such an
approach would apply the state's law that is more likely to result in
justice and promote public policy. Deontological approaches ap-
peal to conformity with certain rules of duty and emphasize prin-
ciples and personal rights,83 as they are more concerned with the
impact of the decisions on individual parties than societal interests.
For these reasons, a deontological approach might be one that ap-
plies the state law that would most protect the parties' expecta-
tions.
These different classifications can apply simultaneously.84
For example, the First Restatement approach is deontological, mul-
tilateralist, and a jurisdiction-selecting system. The interest-
analysis approach and the better-law approach could be described
as consequentialist, unilateralist, and content-selecting. While
these classifications may add more confusion and complexity to
the conflict of law discussion, they explain the legal and social
goals underlying each conflict-of-law approach. Furthermore, they
may give insight into a court's decision to apply a certain ap-
proach. The classifications also add some context to an analysis of
the different approaches described below.
2. The First Restatement Approach
The first conflict-of-law approach that developed was the
First Restatement. The First Restatement was a rejection of the
principle of comity, which guided conflicts of law at that time.85
Comity guided states to respect the laws of other sovereigns. The
First Restatement rejected this principle because it gave courts too
much discretion to enforce or not to enforce the local law in favor
s Id.
82 Id. at 3 (comparing consequentialist approaches to deontological approaches).
83 ld. (arguing that choice-of-law theories should be deontological because choice-of-law
approaches should be content- and forum-neutral).
8 See id.
85 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 71, § 5 I.
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of another state's law.86 Instead, the First Restatement proffered
the vested-rights approach. The vested-rights theory is a geo-
graphical approach to the conflicts problem, in which rights of par-
ties are considered vested in the place in which they were cre-
ated.87 Put simply, this theory states that when an event occurs,
the law where the event occurred would govern.88
The goal of the vested-rights approach is to promote uniform-
ity and ease of administration. 89 This approach consists of a two-
step process. First, the character of the issue involved is deter-
mined, meaning the court determines whether the case involves
tort, contract, property, or some other specific area of law. Sec-
ond, the court applies the choice-of-law rule applicable to that area
of law. Each area of law has a particular choice-of-law rule that
defines where a right vests and therefore, which state's law would
govern. 90
What does this mean in practice? In a tort case, the law of the
"place of the wrong" determines which law governs under this
theory.91 The place of the wrong is the state where the last event
necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.
Usually, for torts the last act is the harm to the plaintiff and, there-
fore, the place of the wrong is usually the place where the injury
occurred.92  There are exceptions to this idea of the place of the
wrong. One such exception deals with vicarious liability. When
vicarious liability is at issue, the place of the wrong applies only if
the defendant authorized the tortfeasor to act for him in that state.
93
Other exceptions to the place of the wrong include when the de-
fendant justifiably relies upon the law of the state where he acted,
but injury occurs in a different state that has a higher standard of
86 See JOSEPH H. BEALE, SELECTIONS FROM A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 16
(1935) (suggesting that conflict-of-law questions be resolved by the "law of the land"). Some
theorists also saw comity as a violation of the notion that no law could have an effect outside of
its jurisdiction. The First Restatement and the vested-rights theory restrained comity because it
limited judges' discretion to a territorial based conflict-of-law theory. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS,
supra note 71, § 51 (b).
87 BEALE, supra note 86, § 15.
88 See id. § 41.
89 SEDLER, supra note 74, at 29.
90 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 71, §§ 51-53; see also Jennifer J. Johnson, Risky
Business: Choice-of-Law and the Unincorporated Entity, I J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 249,
260 (1997) (providing a brief overview of conflict-of-law theories).
91 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
92 Id. §§ 377, 384; see also BEALE, supra note 86, §§ 377.2, 378.2, 384. 1.
93 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 387 (1934); see also RICHMAN & REY-
NOLDS, supra note 7 1, § 53 (explaining that if a defendant did not authorize his agent to enter
that state, then he has not submitted himself to that state's law). However, it is not clear which
state's law would apply when the agent has not been authorized to act, but one might assume
that under the vested-rights theory, a tort analysis would apply.
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care.94 The vested-rights approach provides that the defendant's
"reasonable expectations about the results of his conduct should
not be frustrated because of the fortuity of an out-of-state injury. 95
In a contract case, the law of the "place of making" of the
contract applies.96 The place of the making refers to the place
where the principal event necessary to make a contract occurs.9 7
An exception to this rule is when the issue deals with performance
or breach. In those instances, the place of performance determines
which law governs.98
How would the First Restatement answer the choice-of-law
question posed by broad-shield and narrow-shield LLPs? To an-
swer the question, the court must determine which state's law
would govern the liability of partners for contractual liability.
This question also involves some elements of vicarious liability,
for it seeks to determine if the partners will be liable for contrac-
tual obligations of the partnership and other partners. Under the
vested-rights approach of the First Restatement, the law of the
state of formation may govern.
First, the LLP choice-of-law question presented would in-
volve contractual liability, presumably for a breach of contractual
duties. In a contract situation, the First Restatement calls for the
law of the state where performance was to occur to govern the
question of liability. 99 However, this question is fact specific. The
answer would depend on the particular contract itself. But if the
contract called for an LLP to provide services within the state
where the LLP was formed, then the law of the formation state
would apply and the shield provided partners by the laws under
which they organized would remain intact.
In regards to the vicarious liability aspect of the problem, the
First Restatement provides that a partner would be liable under
another state's laws if he had authorized another partner to act as
94 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 380(2), 382 (1934); RICHMAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 71, § 53. As mentioned above, it is usually the law of the state where
the injury occurs that applies. Where the injury occurs is not necessarily the same location as
where the defendant may have acted.
95 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 71, § 53.
96 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934); BEALE, supra note 86,
§ 332.4.
97 BEALE, supra note 86, § 311.1. There are differences for formal contracts and informal
contracts. In a formal contract setting, the place of delivery is the deciding location. In an
informal contract case, it is the location of the offeree's promise that matters. Other exceptions
include questions dealing with details of contract performance. In such a case, the law of the
place of performance governs. See id. §§ 312.1, 312.2.
98 Id. §§ 355.1,370.1; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 358 (1934).
9 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 358 (1934); BEALE, supra note 86,
§ 370.1.
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an agent in another state.'0° In an LLP, all partners are agents of
the partnership.10' But the vested-rights approach makes excep-
tions for the reasonable reliance and expectations of the defendant.
A partner in a limited liability partnership formed in a broad-shield
state relies on that protection. As a result, a partner may not take
the same precautions to monitor or control the actions of his or her
partners as he or she might have taken in a narrow-shield LLP. A
partner in a narrow-shield jurisdiction, in contrast, knows about
the potential risks of contractual liability and can take some meas-
ures to protect him or herself. Taking the parties' expectations
into consideration, a court will likely recognize the liability shield
of the state of formation.
The vested-rights approach was criticized as favoring predict-
ability over equality and as being too rigid.'0 2 The vested-rights
approach was also criticized because rather than being concerned
with what law is better, it concentrates on labeling the legal issue
involved and locating the jurisdiction where the event happened.'0 3
Other criticisms are that the theory is too simplistic, that it tries to
separate between issues of torts and contracts that often should be
linked, and that it often results in the choice of the law of a place
that has no interest in the case.' °4
3. The Second Restatement Approach
The Second Restatement resulted from these criticisms. The
Second Restatement adopted a more "policy-centered" approach
and chose the applicable law on a case-by-case basis after consid-
ering policy and fairness to parties. 0 5 This analysis applies a bal-
ancing test to determine which state's law governs. However, the
first step under the Second Restatement is to determine if there is
an applicable statutory choice-of-law rule. The Second Restate-
ment provides that if a statutory choice-of-law rule exists, the
court must follow it. 1 6 When a state statute expresses a choice-of-
law rule, the role of the courts becomes interpretive as to the
meaning and objective of the choice-of-law rule. 10 7 When a state's
choice-of-law rule is ambiguous, the courts examine the state's
100 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
10 UNIF. P'SHiP ACT § 9 (1914); REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 301 (1997).
10 2 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 71, § 44 (explaining that the vested-rights ap-
proach was considered too inflexible and that this criticism eventually led to the Second Re-
statement).
103 1d. § 52.
I- Id. § 56.
305 SEDLER, supra note 74, at 28.
106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971).
'
07 LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 72, § 93, at 273.
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policies and interests in determining whether the statute is ade-
quate to answer the choice-of-law question. 108
If there is not an applicable statutory choice-of-law rule, the
court then looks for the state with the "most significant relation-
ship."'1 9 The state with the most significant relationship to the
case is the state whose law applies." 0 To make this determination,
the Second Restatement sets forth a balancing test of several fac-
tors, including: (1) the needs of the interstate system; (2) the rele-
vant policies of the forum and other states involved and the inter-
est of these states in resolving the issue; (3) the basic policies of
the particular area of law involved; (4) the protection of justified
expectations; (5) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result;
and (6) ease of administration."' The Second Restatement does
not call for special weight to be given to any factor, but rather pro-
vides that the judge can balance the factors appropriately."12
In practice, the Second Restatement has separate analyses for
tort and contract cases. For tort cases, the choice-of-law analysis
includes the place where the injury occurred, the place where con-
duct causing the injury occurred, the domicile or the place of busi-
ness of the parties, and the place where the relationship between
the parties centered."13 In a contract case, the Second Restatement
provides that courts should first look to see if the parties specified
a governing law in the contract."14  However, the contractual
choice-of-law provision is not automatically applied. The Second
Restatement provides that a contractual choice of law should be
respected with two exceptions. First, if the chosen state has no
substantial relationship to either party or the contract and there is
no reasonable basis for the specified choice, then the contractual
choice of law will not be followed. Second, courts can reject the
contractual choice of law if the chosen state's law is contrary to a
fundamental policy of another state that has a material interest in
the case." 5 Often, however, the parties' choice of law is upheld.11
6
In instances where there is no contractual choice of law, then such
factors as the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the
108 Id. § 93, at 274 (explaining that courts typically want to find that a state has answered
the choice-of-law problem).
109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
10 See id. §§ 6, 145, 188.
1 Id. § 6(2); see also RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 71, § 59(c); SEDLER, supra note
74, at 34.
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) cmt. c (1971).
113 1d. § 145.
114 Id. § 187 (explaining when the law of the state chosen by the parties should be applied).
11 ld. §§ 186-87.
'
16 Johnson, supra note 90, at 264 (referring to application of the Second Restatement in
modem courts).
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place of performance, the location of the contract's subject matter,
and the domicile of the parties should be examined." 7 The Second
Restatement also includes provisions dealing with contractual li-
ability for partners in general partnerships. These provisions state
that the law of the state with the most significant relationship will
determine whether a partner is liable for obligations of the partner-
ship.11
8
Under this conflict-of-law approach, the outcome to the LLP
choice-of-law question would be the same as under the First Re-
statement, though the analysis would be different. The court
would first look to see if there was an applicable statutory choice-
of-law provision. Most states provide a choice-of-law provision
for LLPs in their statutes." 9 Therefore, the analysis would end
here unless there was some ambiguity in the provision. If there
was an ambiguity, the court would try to resolve it by examining
the objectives and policies underlying the statute. It may be that a
court would determine an LLP choice-of-law statute is unambigu-
ous and adequate to answer a choice-of-law question. But if it
does not, then the court would look for the state with the most sig-
nificant relationship.
In the LLP choice-of-law scenario, it seems that most of the
balancing test factors used to determine the state with the most
significant relationship would favor applying the law of the state
of organization. Applying the law of the state of organization
would protect justified expectations, and aid predictability and uni-
formity. As discussed above, the partners may not have contem-
plated that their liability shield would not extend into other states,
especially since most states have a choice-of-law rule. Therefore,
partners in a broad-shield state would not have taken extra precau-
tions based on their reliance on state law. Applying the law of the
state of formation would also promote uniformity. This is true re-
gardless of whether the case involved an LLP formed under a
broad-shield or narrow-shield jurisdiction. When the law of the
state of formation is chosen, the outcome for partners in LLPs
throughout the formation state will be uniform. Without such a
result, the outcome for partners would then rest on where they
were sued and make liability for contractual obligations an unpre-
dictable matter. Finally, such an outcome would protect the rele-
vant policies of partnership law. Indeed, a state has an interest in
117 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 188(2)(a)-(e) (1971). These factors
are in addition to the balancing test factors set forth in § 6 of the Second Restatement.
118 Id. § 295 (explaining liability of partnerships and partners in accordance with §§ 292
and 294 of the Restatement (Second)).
19 See supra Part I.D. (discussing statutory choice-of-law provisions).
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seeing that its laws are respected and recognized as they apply to
businesses formed within its borders.120  Furthermore, respecting
partners' expectations of liability and providing a uniform result
for partners within a state can act to promote entrepreneurship.1
21
4. The Interest-Analysis Approach
Since the Second Restatement, other conflict-of-law ap-
proaches have developed. These include Brainerd Currie's inter-
est-analysis approach. Under this approach, the default rule is to
apply the forum state's law. 22 When confronted with a choice-of-
law question, interest analysis instructs that the social, economic,
and administrative goals of the forum law should be analyzed, as
well as the policies behind the foreign jurisdiction's law. After
such analysis, if it is determined that the forum state has a gov-
ernmental interest in the case at bar, then the forum state's law ap-
plies. If the forum state does not have an interest, but another state
does, only then does the other state's law govern. 23  However,
Currie did not clarify what factors go into the determination of
state interest. He wrote that it is not clear "whether it implies a
judgment as to the relative merits of the conflicting policies, or a
comparative appraisal of the number, character, and significance
of the relations of the state to the case."'
124
William Baxter modified the interest-analysis approach by in-
cluding external objectives in the choice-of-law consideration.
Baxter initiated a "comparative impairment" analysis. This in-
volved recognition of the fact that each state needs to have its
policies respected by other states. 25  As a result, courts should
compare the extent to which each state's policy would be impaired
if its laws were not applied, and then apply the law of the state that
would suffer the most impairment. 26 Other proposals under this
120 Not only do state LLP provisions include a choice-of-law provision regulating that the
state of formation's laws will be recognized for foreign LLPs, but most include a provision that
LLPs formed under its own laws shall have its internal affairs, including the liability of partners,
governed by that state's laws wherever it may be doing business. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN,
supra note 9, § 6.02(d).
121 See Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative Ex-
planations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480, 1486-87 (2002) (making the
same argument in justifying the internal affairs doctrine, which is a choice-of-law rule that
applies to corporations and provides that the law of the state of incorporation governs questions
of shareholder and director liability).
122 BRAINERD CURRIE, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188, 188 (1963).
12
3 ld. at 189.
1
24 Id. at 272.
'2. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 71, § 64(b) (explaining Baxter's comparative im-
pairment analysis).
126 Id.
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approach include applying the law that favors recovery. However,
the law favoring recovery should not be applied if it is aberrational
or against the national trend.
27
Under this approach, the result to the LLP choice-of-law ques-
tion seems most uncertain. Under Currie's interest-analysis ap-
proach, the outcome may be that the law of the forum state applies
since the default rule favors the law of the forum. But does the
forum state really have an interest in such a case? It may if it has
sufficient contacts with one of the parties or with the contractual
relationship involved. However, a comparative-impairment analy-
sis would change the outcome, as it seems that the law of the state
of organization would suffer greater impairment if it were not ap-
plied. If the forum law were applied in this scenario, the law of
the state where the LLP was organized would be undermined and
would no longer provide for a uniform or predictable result. Part-
ners would no longer know the extent of their liability, despite the
efforts of the state of organization to set some limits to partner li-
ability. In a final twist to this analysis, if recovery were to be con-
sidered as part of the analysis, the outcome would favor the law of
a narrow-shield jurisdiction whether it was the forum state or the
state of formation. This is because a narrow-shield provision al-
lows creditors to recover from partners for contractual liability.
But one can argue that the narrow-shield construction is "aberra-
tional" as it does not coincide with the national trend relating to
partner liability.
28
5. The Better-Law Approach
One final major conflict-of-law approach that developed is
Robert Leflar's better-law approach. Leflar perceived five consid-
erations as influencing the choice of law: (1) predictability of re-
sult; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) sim-
plification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's
governmental interests; and (5) application of the better law. 129
The "better law" means that a law is superior to others when it
achieves societal goals and a just result. 30 While some critics of
the better-law approach argue that it is one way for courts to cloak
their analysis and to consistently apply forum law, that is not and
127 Id. § 64(c) (describing Professor Weintraub's "functional" approach to the interest
analysis, which favors the law that allows recovery unless it conflicts with the national trend).
128 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting that the trend among states is to adopt
a broad-shield liability provision).
1
29 LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 72. § 95.
,30 See id. § 107 (discussing some foundations of better-law determinations).
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should not always be the case. 13 1 The better-law approach involves
some questioning of forum law to see if it is archaic in comparison
to other states' laws. If it is, and if other state laws are influenced
by other policy considerations, then forum law should not apply.'
1 32
Under this approach, the LLP choice-of-law question may be
resolved in favor of the state of organization. First, one of the fac-
tors considered under this approach is the need for predictability.
Applying the law of the state of organization would ensure a pre-
dictable result for partners and would prohibit forum-shopping by
parties. 133 Second, applying the law of the state of organization
would maintain interstate order, as it would encourage freedom in
commercial intercourse and unrestricted transactions of goods and
people from state to state. 34 However, the better-law considera-
tion of this approach may determine in some cases that the law of
the state of formation does not apply. If an LLP formed in a nar-
row-shield jurisdiction was being sued in a broad-shield jurisdic-
tion, the better-law analysis would include an analysis of which
law was outmoded. While LLP statutes are not archaic in any
sense of the word, narrow-shield statutes may be considered as
outmoded as they are not part of the national trend. But this is
only part of the better-law analysis. The court under this approach
could still find that applying the law of the state of organization,
whether it be a narrow-shield or a broad-shield jurisdiction, would
achieve such societal goals as ensuring predictability, encouraging
business, and respecting expectations of parties.
The above discussion shows that there are many options
available to courts when deciding choice-of-law issues. With the
development of these alternative theories, the state of conflicts of
law today remains confusing and uncertain. At present, most
courts follow the Second Restatement. 35 Yet, some courts do not
use the Second Restatement or any of its superseding approaches
because of their complexity and uncertainty. 36 In the sphere of
tort cases, conflict of laws is especially unsettled. 37 Some courts
retain the First Restatement's vested-rights approach. Some juris-
"31 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 71, § 66(b) (discussing concerns with the bet-
ter-law approach).
132 See LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 72, § 107 (examining courts' approaches when the law
of their state is inferior).
133 See generally id. § 103.
13 Id. § 104 (explaining that such freedoms "are necessary to the success of our federal
system").
135 SEDLER, supra note 74, at 28.
136 FRUEHWALD, supra note 74, at 95-96 (criticizing the Second Restatement).
137 See LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 72, § 131 (discussing a variety of choice-of-law ap-
proaches in tort cases).
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dictions reject vested rights, but have not settled on a specific ap-
proach to take its place. Some follow the better-law approach.
Some scholars suggest that there is a trend for tort cases, which is
that choice-of-law decisions favor plaintiffs and forum residents. 138
In contract cases, however, the choice-of-law question is settled.
First and foremost, courts recognize the choice-of-law selection
made by the parties in a contract. When a choice of law is not
stipulated, then the courts will either apply the vested-rights ap-
proach or look for the most significant relationship. However,
whichever approach is chosen, most courts act to protect the ex-
pectations of the parties.1
39
6. Constitutional Considerations and the Choice of Law
No matter what approach a court may use, any conflict-of-law
theory is limited by the Constitution. Constitutional limits on con-
flict-of-law theories include due process, full faith and credit, the
commerce clause, privileges and immunities, and equal protec-
tion. 40 However, the Supreme Court has rarely applied the com-
merce clause, privileges and immunities clause, or equal protection
clause in choice-of-law cases.' 4' The most influential constitu-
tional considerations in choice-of-law questions are due process
and full faith and credit. Due process is concerned with the effects
of the choice of law on parties and seeks to eliminate unfair sur-
prise and to ensure foreseeability of result. 142 Due process is also
concerned with guaranteeing that there is a sufficient interest be-
tween the jurisdiction whose law is applied and the controversy. 43
The constitutional due process requirement acts to limit the reach
of a forum's legitimate authority.'"4 Meanwhile, full faith and
credit mandates respect for legal decisions of other states. 45  It
applies to rules of law as well as to judicial judgments and calls for
nondiscrimination towards legal rules of other states.' 46 However,
this standard generally has been interpreted to mean that a forum
"need only open its doors to the same extent that it would for a
138 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 71, § 72(b).
139 See id. § 73 (noting that protecting the expectations of parties is one of the primary
goals of contract laws).
14°BRILMAYER, supra note 75, at 112 (stating that federalism is "[t]he key constitutional
concept in interstate relations" as it is federalism that makes constitutional limits on state au-
thority necessary).
14 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 71, § 84(b)-(d).
142 Id. § 84(a).
'
43 See BRILMAYER, supra note 75, at 117 (explaining the Supreme Court's historical ef-
forts to determine the required connection).
144Id. at 115.
145 Id. at 129.
146 Id. (explaining the nondiscrimination approach to the full faith and credit clause).
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domestic cause of action."'147 This does not mean that the forum
must subordinate its own laws unless it determines another juris-
diction has a significant interest in the controversy.148
When combined with the conflict-of-law theories described
above, it seems these constitutional limits would favor the applica-
tion of the law of the state of organization in the choice-of-law
question facing LLPs. Due process is concerned with foreseeabil-
ity and unfair surprise to parties. This seems to call for a choice-
of-law ruling that would protect the expectation of parties and lead
to a predictable result for future cases. This is accomplished when
the law of the state of organization is applied. Applying the laws
of a state other than that of formation would require partners to
conduct their business differently in different jurisdictions, in-
creasing the cost of doing business.149 Furthermore, the full faith
and credit clause requires respect to be given to another jurisdic-
tion's laws when it has an interest in having its law applied. The
state of organization does have an interest in seeing that its law is
applied, as it would be a recognition of the state's ability to govern
entities formed within its borders.
In summary, conflict-of-law theories and the constitutional
constraints guiding these theories seem to suggest that the law of
the state of formation should apply to the choice-of-law questions
raised by broad-shield and narrow-shield LLP provisions. This
conclusion is further supported with an examination of choice-of-
law principles that generally apply to corporations and other types
of business associations.
B. Business Entities and the Choice of Law
In regards to corporations, two choice-of-law rules are gener-
ally recognized. First, when the question involves the internal af-
fairs of the corporation, the law of the place of incorporation con-
trols.150 This is known as the internal affairs doctrine. The second
rule states that when the case involves corporate responsibility to
others, general conflict-of-law rules govern.'
5
'
The internal affairs doctrine is a judge-made choice-of-law
doctrine that encourages courts to apply the law of the incorporat-
147 Id.
14sSee id. at 129-31 (discussing situations when another state's laws are treated differ-
ently).
149 Furthermore, easing the costs of business is a benefit to society. See generally BROM-
BERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 3.02 (discussing policy behind limited tort liability); see also
supra note 45 and accompanying text.
1-0 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 71, § 76.
i51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 301 (1971).
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ing state in cases involving corporations.15 2  The origin of the in-
ternal affairs doctrine revolves around the fact that corporations
were created by individual states. 53 When a state agreed, it would
issue a charter to a corporation. The internal affairs rule dictated
that only the chartering state could regulate the entity. The origi-
nal concept was based on the principle that courts did not have ju-
risdiction over foreign corporations. 1
54
As conflict-of-law theories developed, the internal affairs doc-
trine remained intact. Both the First and Second Restatements
supported the doctrine. 55 The doctrine has also garnered statutory
support. The Model Business Corporation Act ("MBCA") con-
tains a provision supporting the enforcement of the internal affairs
rule. 56  Such support exists for the doctrine because the rule al-
lows for uniform treatment in cases where it is needed. 157  The
doctrine also offers the advantages of convenience, certainty, pre-
dictability, and ease of application. 58 The rule has also tradition-
ally applied to cases dealing with imposing liability on sharehold-
ers of the corporation. 59 From this historical analysis of the doc-
trine's application, it seems one could easily argue that there
would be some benefit if the doctrine were applied to limited li-
ability partnerships as well.'6°
However, there are limitations to the application of the inter-
nal affairs rule. While the Second Restatement supported the use
of the internal affairs doctrine, it did so in a qualified way. The
Second Restatement provided that in the event a state other than
the state of incorporation has a more significant relationship with
152 Note, supra note 121, at 1480 (explaining the internal affairs doctrine).
153 Johnson, supra note 90, at 269 (explaining the development of the internal affairs rule
as state charters created corporations).
154 See BEALE, supra note 86, §§ 166.1, 166.2 (noting that a corporation only "exists" in-
side the state of incorporation).
1-.- See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 182-87 (1934) (providing that the
law of the state of incorporation shall apply in certain situations involving corporations); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 306-07 (1971) (proscribing when the law of
the state of incorporation will determine shareholder liability).
'-%MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 15.05(c) (1984) (providing that a state is not authorized to
apply its laws "to regulate the organization or the internal affairs of a foreign corporation au-
thorized to transact business" within the state).
'-7 See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND
OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS § 26.02 (1987) (listing as examples of cases needing uniformity those involving
the election of directors, legality of dividends, and legality of stock issuance).
1.8 Id.
159 One such example was Chandler v. Peketz, 297 U.S. 609 (1936), in which the law of
the state of incorporation provided for double liability of shareholders. Double liability was
enforced even though the law of the forum state and other states did not allow for such liability.
See BLUMBERG, supra note 157, § 26.02 n.20.
'6°See Johnson, supra note 90, at 282-94 (proposing that the internal affairs doctrine be
extended to limited liability partnerships and all other unincorporated business forms).
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the transaction or parties, the law of that state should be applied. 161
Instances in which another state other than the state of incorpora-
tion has a more signification relationship include: (1) when the
corporation has little contact with the state of incorporation except
for incorporating there; (2) the corporation has a significant rela-
tionship to the other state; (3) the rule of the other state embodies
an important policy; (4) the legal issue involved does not affect the
corporate structure or internal administration or other aspect of
corporate affairs for which a uniform rule is essential; and (5) the
subject matter permits the application of multiple regulatory
schemes.162 But it seems this exception to the internal affairs doc-
trine is often ignored.
163
There are also arguments against automatic application of the
doctrine. Phillip Blumberg argues that "[i]n an economy increas-
ingly conducted on a multistate and multinational basis, a choice-
of-law rule involving excessive reliance on the law of the state of
incorporation becomes increasingly unsatisfactory."' 64 This is be-
cause today, most corporations are incorporated in locales far from
where they may be doing business and in locales chosen for rea-
sons unrelated to the business. 65 Also, some states have rejected
the MBCA because of its support for the doctrine. 66 The MBCA's
language creates the presumption that judicial interference with the
application of the doctrine is prohibited. 67  Finally, some states
such as California and New York choose not to apply the doctrine
in some cases involving foreign corporations. 168 However, these
views are in the minority, as the internal affairs doctrine remains
the mainstream approach. 169
The choice-of-law principle guiding corporations is similar to
choice-of-law principles governing other business organizations,
such as general partnerships and limited partnerships. General
161 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302(2), 306 (1971).
162 BLUMBERG, supra note 157, § 26.02; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 302(2) cmt. e-g (explaining application of the significant relationship test).
163 Johnson, supra note 90, at 271.
164 BLUMBERG, supra note 157, § 26.02.
165 See id. (explaining further that almost one-half of the largest corporations in the U.S.
have incorporated in Delaware even though Delaware is unrelated to any location of business,
employees, factories, etc.).
166Note, supra note 121, at 1480-81 (noting that Louisiana and New Jersey have declined
to adopt the language of the 1984 revision of the MBCA and, by doing so, allow their courts to
disregard the internal affairs doctrine).
t67 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 15.05 (1984).
168 Note, supra note 121, at 1480 (explaining that these states do not apply the internal af-
fairs doctrine "in cases involving foreign corporations not traded on a national securities ex-
change with a specified level of contact with the forum state").
169 LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 72, § 255 (identifying challenges to the internal affairs doc-
trine while recognizing that it remains the mainstream approach).
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partnerships are created when partners contract to join together in
order to transact business. 17  Limited partnerships are general
partnerships in which some partners have limited liability and oth-
ers have general liability.' 7' As a result, partnerships are com-
monly treated as contracts for choice-of-law purposes. 172  There-
fore, under the First Restatement, general partnerships are to be
governed by the law of the state in which the partnership agree-
ment was made or to be performed. 73 A state may also choose to
follow the Second Restatement conflict-of-law principles applica-
ble to contracts. 74 Therefore, if the partnership agreement speci-
fied the law to be applied, the court would respect this selection.
If no governing law were chosen, the law of the state with the most
significant relationship would apply. 75  Finally, there have been
statutory developments regarding the choice-of-law question relat-
ing to general partnerships and limited partnerships. The Revised
Uniform Partnership Act provides as a default rule that the law of
the state "in which a partnership has its chief executive office gov-
erns relations among . . . and between the partners."'' 76 The Pro-
posed Revision of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
proposes that "[tihe laws of the State or other jurisdiction under
which the foreign limited partnership is organized govern its inter-
nal affairs and the liability of its partners."'
177
Such statutory provisions exist for limited liability companies
as well. The limited liability company is a business formation that
provides liability protection to all owners and members and is
treated for tax purposes like a partnership. 178  Similar to corpora-
tions, partnerships, and limited partnerships, foreign limited liabil-
ity companies are governed by the law of the state of organiza-
170 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 6 (1914) (defining a partnership as "an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit"); REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 202
(1997) (defining a partnership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit").
17' REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHiP ACT §§ 303, 403 (1985) (defining certain characteristics of
both general and limited partners in limited partnerships).
172 See Johnson, supra note 90, at 275, 277 (indicating, however, that the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act provides that the state of organization governs internal affairs of a
limited partnership).
173 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 71, § 54(a).
'
74 See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
'
75 See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
176 REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 106 (1997). The comments note that this is only a default
rule and that the partners may select another jurisdiction's laws to govern by including such a
provision in the partnership agreement. Also, while the place of a partnership's chief executive
offices may be different from the state of formation, it is important to note that the uniform rule
does not apply, or provide for, the application of the law of the forum state.
177 REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 901(a) (March 2000 Draft).
178 See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, §§ 1.04(c), 301(0 (comparing LLPs to
LLCs).
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tion. 179 This general consensus as to the choice-of-law rule gov-
erning business associations lends much support to the argument
that the law of the state of organization should apply in LLPs as
well.
CONCLUSION
A division exists among state LLP statutes. Some states have
chosen to provide partners a broad liability shield, protecting them
from personal liability for tort and contractual obligations. Other
states extend partners a narrow-shield, protecting them only from
tort liability. This split raises a question: What would happen
when an LLP with one type of liability shield is sued in a state
providing for more or less liability protection?
One source that is available to answer this question is state
choice-of-law provisions for LLPs, as these statutes are uniform
throughout the states. LLP statutes apply the law of the state of
formation to questions dealing with the internal affairs and liability
of the partners. However, due to the haphazard way in which LLP
statutes were adopted, there may be ambiguities in the statutes that
create a loophole to the choice-of-law rule. When that happens,
states may look to conflict-of-law theories to help them decide
which state's law should apply.
Based on the factors considered under each of the major con-
flict-of-law approaches and the constitutional restraints on choice
of law, it seems courts should apply the law of the state of forma-
tion. Applying the law of the formation state will protect the ex-
pectations and justifiable reliance of partners, allow for ease of
administration, allow for predictability, and support the policy
goals of the formation state. Furthermore, the generally applied
conflict-of-law approach for all other business formations results
in the law of the state of organization governing questions of li-
ability. Based on this analysis, a strong argument exists that the
law of the state of formation should govern the liability of part-
ners, wherever they may be sued.
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179 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 1001(a) (1996) (providing that the laws of the state under
which a foreign LLC is organized govern its organization, internal affairs, and the liability of its
managers and members).
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